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Abstract :  
Disappearing computing (DC) is specific in the continuous attention of artefacts  to 
human activity, and because artefacts take initiatives in data collection. Therefore 
privacy is a key design issue.  
These design guidelines for privacy are aimed at system designers and 
stakeholders. Their elaboration is the result of a collective effort funded by the 
European Community IST/Disappearing Computer Initiative, in the Ambient Agoras 
programme (IST-2000-25134). 
This version (1.1) is the first publication of these 9 design guidelines : “think 
before doing”, “re-visit classic solutions”, “openness”, “privacy razor”, “third-party 
guarantee”, “make risky operations expensive”, “avoid surprise”, consider time”, 
“good privacy is not enough”.  
Each guideline is presented as a short title, description of the goal, and design 
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Foreword 
These guidelines are aimed at systems designers, and more generally at all 
stakeholders in disappearing computing (DC) systems design.  
 
Privacy is a difficult issue. The system you (designer, sponsor, client) design may 
have very strong effects in the personal life of its future users.  
These guidelines are a modest, collective, attempt to help you in tackling with the 
complex tradeoffs designers of DC systems have to face. 
Please also consult the glossary at the end of guidelines. 
 
We wish you success in your design effort. 
 
They are *privacy* guidelines, and therefore do not address specifically basic 
design rules for human computer interface or system security, on which there is ample 
literature to be consulted with profit (e.g. [2]). Some guidelines are redundant with 
classic design rules when specifically relevant with privacy issues. Some are 
redundant with more general privacy guidelines (e.g. [1], cf. annex). Still, they were 
inserted to make these guidelines stand-alone and handy for designers. 
 
Disappearing Computing –“DC” (a.k.a. Ubiquitous, Pervasive, Attentive etc. 
Computing, or Augmented Environments) is specific in the continuous attention of 
DC systems to human activity, and because such systems may take initiatives in data 
collection. Therefore DC systems are potentially collecting data beyond individuals’ 
awareness. The following guidelines (European Design Guidelines for Privacy in 
Ubiquitous Computing, in short “EDG-PG”) focus on the specific issues of data 
collection phase by such systems. 
 
Concerning the files built from data collected by these systems, the general privacy 
guidelines should be applied. Most current guidelines worldwide are in the 
philosophy of the OECD 1980 guidelines. Please refer to those classic guidelines, e.g. 
in the annex of this document. Again, some present guidelines may be redundant with 
general privacy guidelines when specifically relevant. 
 
The present guidelines, stemming from a reflection on the state of the art [3], are 
the result of a collective effort through a participative design process [4] involving 
designers, users, and members of the DC and usability research community1. 
Their present state is far from perfect, as there is presently too little experience of 
DC systems operating “in the wild” to have large scale feedback. Also, technological 
                                                          
1 Special thanks to Hugues Bersini (ULB, BE), Jan Borchers (Univ. Aachen, DE), 
Gillian Crampton-Smith (Interaction Design Institute Ivrea, IT), Volker Hartkopf, 
CMU, PA, USA), Calle Jansson (Univ Stockholm, SE), Elie Liberman (Strat-e-go, 
BE), Preben Mogensen (Univ. Aarhus, DK), Valery Nosulenko (Acad. Sciences, 
Russia), Norbert Streitz (Fraunhofer IPSI, DE), Terry Winograd (Stanford Univ, 
CA, USA) for their valuable input in discussing the guidelines. 
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evolution challenges guidelines in strange and unforeseen ways, therefore these 
guidelines will need periodic update.  
This version (EDC-PG 2003) is to be further amended in a continued design cycle. 
The rules provided here are a backbone for a larger operational document presenting 
inspiring examples and case stories. An implementation guide gathering good practice 
should be constructed collectively. 
A committee will organize this update and implementation guide construction, in 
cooperation with other organizations involved in the privacy issue.  
Links will be available at http://www.rufae.net/privacy.html 
 
The Guidelines 
Privacy enhancement is better obtained by actively constructing a system exactly 
tailored to specific goals than by trying to defend ex-post a poor design against 
misuse or attacks. 
 
These guidelines are a series of 9 rules, each presented as a short title, description 
of the goal, and design comments.  
Generally, the goals of the guidelines need effort to be reached. Comments give 
some directions for application.  
 
 
 1. Think Before Doing 
Evaluate potential system impacts. The very nature of a system or its parts may be 
against privacy in their intention. 
 
Privacy issues should always be discussed in specifications. Discuss with 
clients/stakeholders specifications which you think are questionable from a privacy 
standpoint. Designers as Humans have freedom of speech and a social responsibility. 
Be responsible ; you may refuse contribution to some systems. 
 
 2. Re-visit Classic Solutions 
Search for existing solutions in the physical world or in old systems for the similar 
class of problem/service, and understand the way in which new technologies change 
the effects of classic issues.  
 
Most emerging privacy issues (identification, transaction, control, payment, access 
keys, codes etc.) have been socially solved in other “classic” settings. They may not 
always be re-usable, but sometimes transposing these solutions or their mental model 
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may capitalize experience, minimize surprises and make systems more familiar to the 
human users. Location of data or devices (who holds what) in these classic solutions 
is often a crucial feature for privacy. 
 
3. Openness 
Systems should give human users access to what they do, do it, and do nothing 
else. Help human users construct a valid and simple mental model of what the system 
does. Goals, ownership and state of system should be explicit, true, and easily 
accessible to human users, in a simple format. 
 
What the system does especially concerns here the final destination of data 
gathered by the system. 
Each system should display on request to the human user or his client-part (see 
glossary) the list of variables which are required from the human user for operation 
(cf. infra. “Privacy razor”). Display of user profile should be a systematic design 
option. This possibility should be restricted to the user *only for his/her own* data 
(protecting data is an obligation, consider encryption). 
Beware: excessive verbosity of systems and excessive notice to users without 
demand provoke bypass, and are unrealistic. Openness is a goal, and the possibility 
for the willing user to access his/her data in the system, it does not means systematic 
notice.  
Open source is a guarantee of transparency. 
When “system” is another human user (live, mediated by communication system), 
disclosure should be symmetrical. 
System state should be accessible on demand as display, and as data. 
 
4. Privacy Razor 
Human user characteristics seen by the system should contain ONLY elements 
which are necessary for the explicit goal of the activity performed with the system. No 
data should be copied without necessity. In case of doubt, remember further 
information may be added in context. 
 
During design, the privacy reduction consists in examining each of all variables 
describing user-face, and trying to eliminate as many as possible. Identity is seldom 
necessary. The best system is one so lean that nothing more could be taken away. 
Ideally, Client should “Display Minimal Characteristics”, and System should 
“Require Minimal Characteristics” to operate.  
This includes display issues (display needs no copy, prefer displays on the user’s 
devices). Hardware sometimes copies data in cache or buffers: implement erasing 
procedure. 
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This is a hard guideline; it imposes a very clear vision of the system’s 
functionalities, and is far from current practice. The list of variables should be made 
in any case; and choice left to the user for providing non necessary data. 
When appliances are embedded into larger systems, the privacy razor helps 
clarifying which application gathers data for what. It may be a legitimate design 
choice to bypass locally the privacy razor rule for better global operation; consider the 
sensitivity of data at stake. 
 
5. Third Party Guarantee 
Using a neutral or trusted third party may open more solutions or lighter design. It 
may enable entitlement, validation, control, claim, archive, etc. without direct data 
transfer between system and human user. In case of third party involvement, give the 
user choice. 
 
Using simultaneously three keys (human user, system, third party) enables 
transactions where each party can impeach the transaction, and where future 
cancellation of entitlement is possible.  
Access rights to the services provided by the system may be granted through 
tokens. Token validation or verification should be possible only with the human 
user’s agreement, avoid direct identification of human user by system.  
Third party guarantee may prove useful to enable recovering rare but incurring 
incidents (client claims with lost tokens, local system failure, identity theft issues…) 
without imposing extra local data capture in system to plan for such incidents.  
 
6. Make Risky Operations Expensive 
No system is 100% privacy safe. Human users should be made aware of which 
operations are privacy-sensitive. 
Operations identified as privacy-sensitive should be made costly for the system, the 
human user, the third party.  
 
General design guideline, here also intended to make the operation costly and 
difficult to be done on a large scale by computer agents. Systematic cost (a few cents 
or small time delay), or mere obligation of tracing record of who accessed the data 
may be a high enough cost to discourage potential abusers. 
In some cases this guideline can be dangerous (e.g. access to medical data in 
emergency situations). Consider exceptions and plan solutions (e.g. third party 
control). 
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7. Avoid Surprise 
Human users should be made aware when their activity has an effect on the 
system. Acknowledgement should be explicit for irreversible major changes. 
Cancellation should be an option as much as possible, not only in the interface, but in 
the whole interaction with the system. 
 
This is a general design guideline, but crucial in DC where user awareness is 
lower.  
System should display a response to human user’s action if it has influence on their 
state, and display major change of state. Traces of these acknowledgements should be 
recorded on system, and recordable by user. Be aware of the trade-off between 
cognitive overflow and awareness; enable customizing default acknowledgements. 
Technical and social solutions exist to make default privacy level choices without 
overloading the user with acknowledgement demands. Consider P3P. 
 
8. Consider Time 
Expiry date should be the default option for all data.  
 
Expiry delay is often fixed by law. Use common sense. User benefits should be 
proportionate to risks.  
Saving data is often a design choice for reasons not directly relevant to the service 
provided, e.g. security against system crash, cache, resource optimization, or design 
simplicity. These design issues are legitimate but should be considered separately and 
solved in relevant ways.  
It makes a big difference to plan oblivion, even in the long (legal) term. Privacy 
issues may arise from traces of what users did long ago in former social positions.  
The DC design case is quite specific: leave long-time record to legal systems. In 
case of doubt, be on the user’s side. 
 
9. Good Privacy Is Not Enough 
Safety, security, sustainability, equity… are important issues with which trade-offs 
may have to be considered. These trade-offs should be discussed with stake-holders or 
their representatives as much as possible.  
 
The designer’s point of view is always limited. Most rules are social compromises. 
Explicit the trade-offs between privacy and other issues (e.g. reciprocity, emergency 
access, global security) and trace design choices for further discussion with stake-
holders, or updates: new technologies may enable a better solution on the tradeoff. 
Things change. New issues appear. Make sure human users are empowered to 
feed-back and complaint by implementing the function in the interface. 
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Glossary: 
In the EDC-PG guidelines:  
“Activity” is the sequence of actions at stake in the interaction between human user 
and system. 
“Human user” is a human physical entity (person, group), with a physical body. 
“User-face” is the human user as seen by the system. 
“System-face” is the system as seen by the human user. These definitions may be 
relative : in a peer-to-peer system, a client may be seen as someone else’s server 
 “System” is the combination of material hardware and programmed software 
which are designed to provide services to faces, directly through the means of natural 
human body or through the use of devices. 
“Device” is a physical artifact which may interact with the system. 
“Location”: An entity, system, program, data or element is said to “be located” 
where it can be completely destroyed. E.g. a system is said to “be located” in a device 
if it has no copy elsewhere. 
“Display”: representation in a form directly affordable to the human senses. 
“Server part” describes the part of system which is not located by the user, seen 
from the user.  
“Client part” is the part of the system which is located by the user. 
 
Annex : OECD Guidelines, 1980-1998 
 
1. Collection Limitation Principle 
There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should 
be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or 
consent of the data human user: 
 
2. Data Quality Principle 
Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, 
to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-
to-date. 
 
3. Purpose Specification Principle 
9.The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later 
than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of 
those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are 
specified on each occasion of change of purpose. 
 
4. Use Limitation Principle 
Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for 
purposes other than those specified in accordance with Paragraph 9 except: (a) with 
the consent of the data human user; or (b) by the authority of law. 
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5. Security Safeguards Principle 
Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such 
risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of 
data. 
 
6. Openness Principle 
There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and 
policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of 
establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their 
use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller. 
 
7. Individual Participation Principle 
An individual should have the right: (a) to obtain from a data controller, or 
otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him; 
(b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him (i) within a reasonable time; 
(ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; (iii) in a reasonable manner; and (iv) in a 
form that is readily intelligible to him; (c) to be given reasons if a request made under 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and (d) to 
challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful, to have the data 
erased, rectified, completed or amended. 
 
8. Accountability Principle 
A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give 
effect to the principles stated above. 
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